Study on Evolutionary Game of Quality Regulation of Tea Products in Guizhou — Simulation Analysis Based on the Case of Meitan-Fenggang Counties
Gao Yuxiang
*
Department of Mathematics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Guizhou Normal University, China.
*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
To address the challenges of unbalanced regional development and coordination in quality regulation within the tea industry of Guizhou, this study constructs an improved evolutionary game model that incorporates a government punishment mechanism () and a performance evaluation coefficient (). By means of replicator dynamics equations and Matlab simulation, the study analyzes the evolutionary paths of quality regulation strategies adopted by Meitan County and Fenggang County in Guizhou under different costs, benefits, and policy pressures. Research Findings: (1)Regulation cost is a key factor determining the evolutionary direction. When the regulation cost of Fenggang County exceeds 1.8 million yuan, the system will fall into a "low-level equilibrium trap" of (non-implementation, non-implementation); (2) Regional collaboration can effectively break through cost constraints. When the external effect coefficient rises to 0.9, the system's stable strategy shifts to (implementation, implementation), and the regulation ratio increases by 22.7%. (3) The punishment mechanism has an effective threshold of 0.8 million yuan, and when the value is below this threshold, the constraint is significant. This study reveals the key parameter thresholds and synergistic effects in government intervention, and provides theoretical support and practical guidance for Guizhou's tea industry to strengthen regional cooperation, set targeted punishment standards, and thereby enhance its overall competitiveness.
Keywords: Quality regulation, evolutionary game, tea industry, system simulation, stability analysis